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D Cancer treatment is often carried out within protocol-based clinical trials. 
An oncology clinic may take part in many trials each of which requires data 
to be collected for monitoring efficacy and toxicity of treatment. Subse- 
quently, these data are analyzed statistically to evaluate clinical objectives 
of the trial. To be scientifically valid, such analysis must be based on 
data that are both complete and correct. This is one motivating factor 
for introducing computer support for trial management. Further motiva- 
tion is provided by concern that treatment is consistent with the protocol 
and the well-being of the patient. The complexity of many protocols, the 
life-threatening ature of cancer, and the toxicity of treatment side effects 
emphasize the safety-critical nature of oncology. The OaSiS system pro- 
vides decision support for the protocol-based treatment of cancer patients 
with emphasis on the safety aspects of the advice it gives. It offers a graph- 
ical and spreadsheet-style interface, employs integrity constraint checking 
techniques from logic databases to monitor compliance with a protocol, 
and is implemented in PROLOG. This paper describes the main features 
of OaSiS and indicates work in progress and planned research. <] 
1. INTRODUCTION 
OaSiS is a decision support system for the management of cancer patients based 
on the written protocols which govern clinical trials of therapies. Such computer 
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support is necessary because the protocols are complex and there is a need for 
complete and correct accumulation of clinical data before scientifically valid statis- 
tical analysis can be carried out. This paper focuses on the current functionality of 
OaSiS and discusses the use of safety related knowledge identified from an extensive 
study of oncology protocols and from discussions with clinicians, pharmacists, and 
medical informaticians. The safety-critical nature of the domain imposes require- 
ments on software designers and implementors to ensure that the translation from 
paper to computerized protocol is completed thoroughly and correctly [8]. 
A major influence on OaSiS is the work at Stanford University on the ON- 
COCIN [31], EON [25], and OPAL [24] family of computer systems. In the OaSiS 
prototype, this is particularly evident in the user interface and its combined use 
of graphical, form-based, and spreadsheet-like windows to present and manipu- 
late clinical data. A second influence is the work arising from the BOSS [28] and 
DILEMMA projects [10] at the Imperial Cancer Research Fund (ICRF) which have 
affected the underlying protocol model, decision-making procedures, and function- 
ality. More specialized systems have been produced for radiotherapy planning [15, 
26], for breast cancer [9, 19], for ovarian cancer [20], and for head and neck cancer 
[22]. The main differences between the work on OaSiS and that of other projects on 
cancer management systems is the emphasis on safety issues and the use of analysis 
and implementation methods employing logic-based techniques. 
Before illustrating what OaSiS can offer to a clinical user, we provide some 
background to the domain and explain in more detail why such software is necessary 
and potentially beneficial. The final section of the paper describes plans for future 
improvements. 
1.1. Protocol-Based Treatment in Cancer Trials 
Variation in tumour behavior and the variety of cancer therapies inhibit the se- 
lection of optimal treatments of many cancers. Instead, patients are entered in 
clinical trials involving combinations of surgery, hormone therapy, radiotherapy, 
and chemotherapy with the aim of evaluating efficacy and safety. Clinical trials are 
governed by procedures, or protocols, which detail how they should be planned. A 
wide range of issues is presented in protocols, which are detailed, complex docu- 
ments. However, there is a common structure to the organization of many cancer 
trials and those tasks amenable to computerization are listed in Figure 1. 
Clinical trials typically have a number of "arms" specifying chemotherapies 
and other treatments to which patients are randomly assigned for subsequent 
Eligibility 
Randomization/trial registration 
Pre-treatment investigations 
Treatment planning (chemotherapy, hormone therapy, radiotherapy; surgery) 
Monitoring response of disease (typically tumor size and incidence) 
Monitoring response of patient (typically side-effects) 
Modification of disease treatment as a result of the monitoring 
Treatment of side-effects 
Treatment follow-up and end-points 
F IGURE 1. Tasks common to cancer trials and amenable to computer izat ion.  
PROTOCOL-BASED TREATMENT OF CANCER 95 
i, To determine whether treatment with the intensive regimen BOP/VIP-B is more 
effective than treatment with BEP/EP in the management of patients with poor 
prognosis metastatic teratoma with respect o complete response rate, progression- 
free and overall survival. 
ii. To determine the effect of r-metHug-CSF on the proportion of patients receiving full 
dose intensity of combination chemotherapy with either BOP/VIP-B or BEP/EP. 
F IGURE 2. Objectives of protocol TEl3 [23]. 
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comparison and for evaluation of trial objectives. Indeed, most protocols begin 
with an explicit statement of such objectives (Figure 2). 
The high level tasks of a protocol and their temporal ordering are often presented 
diagrammatically (Figure 3). 
The trial depicted [23] has four randomization arms, each comprising different 
sequences of combinations of chemotherapeutic drugs. At the next level of detail, 
Figure 4 illustrates the complexity of planning this particular chemotherapy. Drugs 
are given singly or in combination on particular days of cycles. 
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Data collected in 44 weeks for a bone cancer trial [3]. 
1.2. The Need for Computer Support in Oncology 
A written protocol can be between 20 and 60 pages in length and a major oncology 
clinic may use as many as 60 protocols concurrently [31]. The amount of clinical 
data collected (Figure 5) and the complexity of some protocols call for computerized 
management of the patient's clinical details, the clinician's diagnosis, the treatment 
plan, and the subsequent treatment modifications arising from therapeutic effects 
and toxic side-effects. 
Patients do not always receive therapy in precisely the manner prescribed by 
the protocol, and data needed for formal analysis of treatment results are not 
always completely and accurately collected [31]. Inadequately collected ata have 
invalidated a number of large-scale clinical trials. 1 Therefore, potential benefits of 
the use of decision support software are improved compliance with the protocol and 
improved data collection [16, 18]. With more accurate and more complete data, 
the statistical evaluation of trial objectives can be more effective with concomitant 
improvements in medical knowledge and in the treatment of patients. 
1.3. The Safety-Critical Nature o/ Decision Support in Oncology 
Common side-effects of chemotherapy include bone marrow suppression and dam- 
age to the gastrointestinal mucosa. Bone marrow suppression lowers white cell 
count and makes a patient susceptible to serious infections. If the platelet count is 
low, then severe bleeding may occur. Mucositis is unpleasant, causes evere weight 
loss and dehydration, and provides a route for infection. Some unusual drug side- 
effects cause severe lung and heart problems. Thus, there is a narrow therapeutic 
window between giving sufficient drug for optimal antitumor effects and for life- 
threatening toxicity. Therefore, protocol guidelines for dose adjustment must be 
followed if the patient's life is not to be put at risk. Adverse toxic events are often 
presented in a table of hazards describing means for their detection and possible 
ameliorating actions (see Figure 6). 
Some users of an oncology decision support system will be sufficiently expert o 
detect inaccuracies and potentially hazardous advice before it is acted upon. Less 
experienced junior doctors may fail to spot incorrect advice simply because they 
are unfamiliar with the protocol or the drug side-effects. Whether it is to avoid 
losing the confidence of experienced oncologists or to avoid unsafe recommendations 
]The variation in quality control of data capture in multicenter t ials has been of particular 
concern [33]. 
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Hazard Monitoring Drug Modification Duration 
All Bone 
marrow 
suppression 
wbc < 1.5k OR 
platelets < 50k 
Suspend 
Abort protocol 
wbc > 3k AND 
platelets E [50k,75k] 
wbc E [2.1k,3k] AND 
platelets > 50k 
wbc E [1.5k, 2k] AND 
platelets :> 75k 
wbc E [1.5k, 2k] AND 
platelets E [ 50k,75k] 
Cisplatin 
Etoposide 
Ifosfamide 
Etoposide 
Ifosfamide 
Etoposide 
Ifosfamide 
75 percent dose 
50 percent dose 
3 days if 
no improvement 
after 2 weeks 
This cycle 
of treatment 
Renal Creat. clear. < 40k Cisplatin 75 percent dose Until 
impairment Bleomycin Withdraw recovery 
Bleomycin Withdraw Skin 
toxicity 
Mucosal 
toxicity 
Lung 
scarring 
Sensitivity 
All 
Bleomycin 
Cisplatin 
Severe 
rash 
Severe 
ulcers 
Withdraw Shortness 
of breath 
Acute allergic reaction 
Permanently 
F IGURE 6. Hazards, monitoring conditions, and corrective actions [3]. 
being acted upon, extreme care must be taken to ensure that the transition from 
paper protocol to computerization through abstract representation is as complete 
and correct as is possible. It is essential, therefore, that safety issues are thoroughly 
investigated before detailed software design and implementation begin. Preliminary 
results of work on safety aspects of OaSis are reported elsewhere [12]. 
2. THE OASIS  SOFTWARE 
2.1. Background and Overview 
Following a study of ICRF's previous and existing projects on decision support 
systems in oncology [28, 10] andsimilar activities at Stanford University [18, 31], 
the development of OaSiS began in late 1992/early 1993. Primarily, the prototype 
has been produced as a demonstrator to oncologists with a view to recruiting their 
active contribution to the future design and implementation of a fully fledged sys- 
tem. In addition, the safety-critical nature of decision support in oncology could 
not be identified fully without clinical participation. Secondary aims have been 
to test methodological pproaches to the associated ecision-making and to their 
implementation i PROLOG on available hardware. A further aim has been to 
experiment with the user interface, which needs to be highly graphical given the 
nature of the clinical data. The collaborating oncology clinic at the Churchill Hospi- 
tal in Oxford uses Macintosh computers and so MacPROLOG [21], with its built-in 
facilities for dialogue and graphics management, was an obvious programming en- 
vironment o select. 
Currently, OaSiS has seven major components as indicated in Figure 7. 
The main mode of interaction with OaSiS is analogous to that of a conventional 
spreadsheet. Typically, the user enters the relevant clinical data and, once vetted 
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F IGURE 7. Major components and functionality of the OaSiS prototype. 
and recorded, OaSiS automatically generates advice for chemo- and other thera- 
pies according to the protocol recommendations for the appropriate stage of the 
patient's treatment. Should the user try to override these calculations by making 
some alteration, then safety constraints are brought to bear in a style typical of 
logic databases. In subsequent sections of the paper, we illustrate how the clinician 
uses OaSiS to generate treatment recommendations and how alterations or sugges- 
tions by the user are checked for compliance with the computerized protocol. This 
will involve descriptions of patient eligibility criteria for trim entry, the user inter- 
face, some components of the knowledge base, and the animation of the underlying 
protocol itself. 
2.2. The Representation f Eligibility Criteria 
Eligibility criteria for clinical trial entry are typically represented as a collection of 
including and excluding conditions. Protocol TE09 [13], for example, has eligibility 
criteria as shown in Figure 8. 
Eligibility is considered on a particular day, and so a straightforward epresen- 
tation begins with: 
patient_passes_eligibility_criteria_on_date(Patient, te0g, Date) ~- 
has_satisfactory_diagnosis_on_date (Patient, te09, Diagnosis, Date), 
satisfactory_staging_for_protocol_and_diagnosis (Patient, te09, Date), 
not excluded_frorn_protocol_by_raised_serum_markers (Patient, te09, Date), 
not already_received_chemotherapy(Patient, Date), 
satisfactory_age_on_date(Patient, te09, Date), 
satisfactory_consent_by_patient_before(Patient, teO9, Date). 
(Throughout the paper we use the convention that strings beginning with an up- 
percase letter are variables.) 
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1. Histologically confirmed non-seminatomous germ cell tumor of the testis or combined 
seminoma/teratoma or seminoma with serum alpha feto protein concentration > 25 
ku per liter. 
2. The following stage categories are eligible: 
Stage I with raised serum marker (see 3). 
Stage II with masses up to 10 cm in diameter. 
Stage III with abdominal mass up to 10 cm in diameter or supraclavicular/mediastinal 
masses ~ 5 cm. 
Stage IV with up to 20 lung masses. Patients with other sites (e.g., liver, bone, or 
brain) are excluded. 
3. Patients with serum beta HCG > 10,000 iu per liter or serum AFP > 1000 ku per liter 
are excluded. 
4. No previous chemotherapy given. 
5. Age greater than 15 years. 
6. Informed consent given for the proposed study. 
F IGURE 8, Textual statement of eligibility criteria [13]. 
For a further example, the check that the diagnosis is acceptable is defined as: 
has_satisfactory_diagnosis_on_date (Patient, te09, Diagnosis,Date)~-- 
patient_diagnosis(Patient, Diagnosis), 
diagnosis_compatible(Diagnosis, te09, Patient, Date). 
diagnosis_compatible(['non-seminatomous germ cell tumor'],te0g,Patient,Date). 
diagnosis_compatible([seminoma,teratoma], te09, Patient, Date). 
diagnosis_compatible([teratoma,seminoma], te09, Patient, Date). 
diagnosis_compatible([seminoma], te09, Patient, Date) ~- 
afp(Patient, Date, AFP), AFP > 25. 
askable(afp(Patient, Date, Result)). 
The declaration askable(Predicate) means that all information regarding Predicate 
is to be obtained from the user (or an external source) in the query-the-user fashion 
[29]. 
The representation f eligibility criteria also illustrates the current use in OaSiS 
of a temporal argument for those predicates involving time. Protocols often include 
temporal references to treatments, particularly chemo- and hormone therapies, in 
a relative fashion in terms of cycles of treatment. Thus, it is necessary to have both 
relative and absolute descriptions of time points, with the former being used for 
drug calculation rules (see section 2.5) and the latter for eligibility, patient records, 
and visit scheduling. 
2.3. The User Interface 
The graphical user interface (Figure 9) handles all interaction with the user through 
the manipulation of iconic-, form-, and tabular-based presentations of clinical data. 
All interactions are viewed either as data entry or query invocation. A graphics 
window (e.g., MASS/X-RAY POSITIONS in Figure 9) is used for entering and 
presenting tumor incidence in an iconic format. Forms (e.g., PATIENT DATA) 
are generated from a form description language and are typically used to present 
and enter administrative data. Data that are tied to dates of clinic visits (see 
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F IGURE 9. The OaSiS userinterface for trial management. 
VISIT window) are presented spreadsheet-style in a tabular format (examples in- 
clude HAEM for blood test results and CHEMO for calculated rug dosages). 
So as not to overwhelm a user with too much data, each window can be toggled 
to a closed state (by clicking on its label) whereby it is presented as a slim, la- 
beled, horizontal band (for example MASS/X-RAY and OTHER-TREAT). These 
spreadsheet-like windows have been implemented using lower level primitives be- 
cause MacPROLOG does not support hem directly. 
2.4. The Knowledge Base and Problem Solving in OaSiS 
A major part of the knowledge base deals with aspects of cancer management 
which are independent of particular protocols. Individual modules contain protocol- 
specific knowledge for particular types of cancer as well as a small subcomponent 
describing the forms and "spreadsheets" for configuring the general user interface 
for that protocol. A third component contains drug information extracted from the 
protocols tudied, supplemented bystandard texts [1, 2, 7]. 
OaSiS can be thought of as a kind of "expert system shell" restricted to the 
domain of oncology. It can be used with any protocol provided the following details 
are provided: 
A partial ordering defining the sequence of high-level tasks. 
A description of the randomization arms. 
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F IGURE 10. Violations of data integrity and safety constraints. 
Trial eligibility criteria. 
A description of chemotherapy or hormone therapy as cycles and days of treat- 
ment. 
A list of blood and other tests and their frequency for toxicity monitoring. 
Default drug prescriptions (dose, units, route, formulation, administration, etc.). 
Dose modification rules according to toxicity monitoring. 
Definition of the user interface for the particular form and tabular layout re- 
quired. 
The remainder of the oncology knowledge base handles the sequencing of high 
level tasks, the scheduling of clinic visits, the computation of precise drug doses 
and their days for administration, and the checking of the integrity of user input. 
The latter covers both data input errors as well as the application of specific safety 
knowledge (Figure 10). 
Once the clinician accepts a computed treatment suggestion or OaSiS accepts 
the user's modification of its suggestion, the result of this negotiation is added to 
the record of the treatment plan. A more extensive discussion of safety related 
matters appears in Section 2.6. 
Currently, the knowledge base is represented in Horn clauses extended with 
negation as failure. Thus, most problem solving can be carried out directly by the 
underlying PROLOG interpreter. Interaction with the user, for obtaining clinical 
data about patients, is handled by a query-the-user mechanism [29]. 
2.5. Administration of Therapies at Clinic Visits 
Treatment is usually coordinated through clinic visits as indicated in a separate 
window VISIT in the OaSiS interface (Figure 9). By pressing the "Next visit" 
button, a new visit date can be generated according to the schedule specified in 
the protocol. A mouse click on a new date causes a summary of the purpose of the 
visit to be generated (Figure 11). 
Figure 11, for example, indicates that the patient is due to receive two drugs 
as part of chemotherapy and that two blood test results are also required. The 
chemotherapy component of a trial will include rules about modifications to drug 
dosage according to the results of these blood tests and other factors. Unless the 
oncology clinic is connected directly to a laboratory computer, the data will need to 
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F IGURE 11. Querying purpose of next clinic visit. 
be entered by hand. The hematological data are presented in a separate window in- 
dexed by the date of the clinic visit when blood specimens, etc., were acquired. New 
data entered in the HAEM spreadsheet-style window are not recorded permanently 
until the user requests it. When a new clinic visit date has been generated and ac- 
cepted, and the relevant laboratory results have been added, OaSiS automatically 
computes and displays drug dosages. 
We use the predicate 
modification(Chemotherapy, CycleDay, Drug, Patient, Factor) 
to define the drug modification Factor for Patient being treated on day CycleDay 
with Drug during a particular Chemotherapy regimen. For example, the TE09 
protocol [13] requires the drug dose to be unchanged (i.e., Factor = 1) provided 
that toxicity (as measured by blood tests) remains within certain bounds: 
modification(reg(te09, bep, Version), day(Cycle, Day), etoposide, Patient, 1) ~-- 
Cycle > 1, 
result_on_day(wbc, Patient, te0g, bep, day(Cycle, 1), WBC), 
WBC ~_ 2000, 
result_on_day(platelets, Patient, te0g, bep, day(Cycle, 1), PlateletCount), 
PlateletCount > 90000. 
In other circumstances the drug dose needs to be reduced by 25%: 
modification(reg(te09, bep, Version), daY(CYcle, Day), etoposide, Patient, 0.75) ~- 
Cycle > 1, 
result_on_day(platelets, Patient, te0g, bep, day(Cycle, 1), PlateletCount), 
in_range(PlateletCount, (51000,89000)). 
The results of these dose calculations are presented automatically to the user 
in the CHEMO spreadsheet-style window. In Figure 12, we can see the result of 
applying these rules to the calculation of the latest modified dosage for the drug 
etoposide where the default value of 240 has been modified to 180 because of the 
results of blood tests shown in the HAEM window. 
Figure 6 earlier illustrated how treatment modifications can be at various levels 
of severity and for different periods of duration. For example, individual drug 
administrations can be modified to a smaller or larger dosage, either singly or in 
groups, as well as being suspended temporarily or even aborted altogether. The 
duration of modifications can either be absolute (typically a week or so) or relative 
in terms of treatment cycles or until the patient's reaction to toxicity reaches ome 
acceptable state. 
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F IGURE 12. Dose modification of etoposide (240 to 180) on 22/10/92. 
2. 6. Negotiating a Safe Treatment 
OaSiS suggests treatments and their modification according to accepted clinical 
practice and the protocol governing the trim under which the patient is being 
treated. If the clinician disagrees, then it must be possible to suggest an al- 
ternative. Of course, checks on such modifications will be made. The clinician 
may also need to record additional treatments, for example, for illnesses unre- 
lated to the malignancy or for side-effects. The proposed medication should ob- 
viously be validated against known contraindications, especially those specified in 
the protocol. 
Next, we illustrate two of the safety principles mentioned earlier which have been 
extracted following an intensive study of many oncology protocols. An instance of 
the first safety rule is the following: 
Ex.R5. Nephrotoxic antibiotics such as Gentamycin should be avoided during the Cis- 
platin infusion [3]. 
This is quoted verbatim as it appears in the protocol. Similar examples occur 
in many oncology protocols. Underlying them is a general principle that actions 
outside the recommended treatment plan are barred if they are likely to exacerbate 
an existing hazard arising from the treatment i self. It is such general principles 
that analysis of protocols has identified and which we seek to represent in OaSiS, 
in as general a fashion as possible. Informally, the principle underlying Ex.R5 can 
be expressed as: 
R5:Action1 should not be performed during Action~ in Plan if 
Action2 is necessary part of Plan and 
Action~ produces E~ect and 
Effect is potentially hazardous and 
Action1 aggravates or makes E~ect more likely and 
Action] has alternative without EJ~ect 
The actual formulation (as an integrity constraint) will be shown in a moment. 
The specific information contained in Ex.R5 is represented as a set of facts (some 
of which are implicit in its original formulation) to be used in conjunction with 
principle (R5). Thus: 
104 P. HAMMOND AND M. SERGOT 
prod uces_effect(admin_of(cisplatin), impaired_renal_function). 
hazardous(impaired_renal_function). 
aggravates( admin_ of(gentamycin ), impaired_renal_function). 
These safety restrictions are employed in OaSiS in two main ways: to generate a 
warning message immediately and as integrity constraints to check any additional 
prescriptions that might be made during the actual consultation itself. 
A second example of safety knowledge concerns the barring of actions that re- 
duce efficacy of treatment. We have been able to formulate a general rule which, 
informally, can be stated as follows: 
R6:Action1 should not be performed uring Actio~ in Plan if 
Action2 is necessary part of Plan and 
Action1 diminishes efficacy of Action2 and 
Action1 is unnecessary part of Plan or has an alternative 
Two instances of its use come from a trial involving the drug Interferon-a2~ [30]: 
Ex.R6a. Aspirin may reduce the efficacy of Interferon-a2c~. Therefore, aspirin will not 
be used. Indomethacin does not have this effect. 
Ex.R6b. Corticosteroids may reduce the efficacy of Interferon-a2c~ and should not be 
prescribed for side-effects. 
These specific instances are again represented as facts to be used in conjunction 
with (R6), as follows: 
reduces_efficacy(ad rain_of(aspirin), ad min_of(interferona)). 
red uces_efficacy(ad min_of(corticosteroids), ad min_of(interferona)). 
Rules such as (R5) and (R6), shown informally above, are represented as in- 
tegrity constraints on the database recording the negotiated treatment plan, in the 
usual logic database style (see, e.g., [11]). For illustration, rules (R5) and (R6) are 
represented as follows: 
(ICR5) invalid(user_suggestion(perform(Action1), Plan))~- 
part_of(Action2, Plan), 
prod uces_effect(Action 2, Effect), 
hazardous(Effect), 
aggravates(Actionl, Effect), 
is_avoidable(Action 1, Plan). 
(ICR6) invalid(useLsuggestion(perform(Actionl), Plan)) ~- 
part_of(Action2, Plan), 
red uces_efficacy(Action 1, Action2), 
is_avoidable(Action 1, Plan). 
Although it is usual to write integrity constraints in the form of denials, we 
find it more convenient to employ the form shown above. The reason is simply 
that all conditions except for user_suggestion are static, in the sense that they are 
stored in parts of the OaSiS system which the user does not modify during a 
consultation with the system. Here invalid can be read as an alternative symbol 
to -1 for (standard, truth-functional) negation. It also has an operational meaning, 
to signal that in the case of violation of the constraint it is this condition, i.e., 
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ADDITIONAL TREATMENT FOR: Albert Merridale 
Indications [ Oru~$ J] 
Patient: AIbert Merridale 
Date: 1110192 7 
/ 
FOR: genl~mlcln can be prescribed for fever : 
AGAINST: I 
Chemoth~l~ for this patient Includes ¢lsplatln I 
which can cause renal_Impalrment. ! 
! 
gen~mk:ln aggravates this olffoct and ~ its 
adminis&atk>n is potentially h~zardous. 
F IGURE 13. Arguments for and 
against selection of a particular treat- 
ment. 
the attempted input, which is to be rejected. Any integrity constraints that are 
violated can be presented in the form of a critique of the user's action as arguments 
for and against (see Figure 13). 
Here the user has requested assistance with treating a fever and has then asked 
for an explanation as to why gentamicin is contraindicated. The argument against 
is generated from (ICR5). 
We have illustrated only two of the half a dozen or so generic safety rules we have 
found [12]. The others are concerned with avoidance of hazardous ide-effects by 
applying suitable prophylactic treatments, warnings about incorrectly performed 
treatments, recommendations to perform adequate monitoring of side-effects, and 
actions to ameliorate toxic effects as soon as they have been observed. 
3. WORK IN  PROGRESS AND PLANNED 
3.1. Improvements o User Interface and Data Representation 
Graphical presentation and entry of data are likely to be of considerable bene- 
fit to clinical users. With a suitable internal model of simple human anatomy, 
multiple views of tumor incidence should be displayed as well as more rapid or 
transient presentations of associated quantitative data. Alternatively, tumor inci- 
dence/dimensions could be presented graphically alongside hematological data or 
chemotherapy and indexed by clinic visit so that treatment progress can be rapidly 
reviewed. Graphical overviews of important clinical events are more usefully pre- 
sented in terms of time lines with clear separation of treatment in the past, present, 
and that planned for future clinic visits. Later, we shall also be considering the 
production of aids for clinicians to define their own protocols for in-house use and 
employing a graphical interface along the lines of the OPAL protocol editor imple- 
mented at Stanford University [24]. 
3.2. Representational Formalism and the Treatment of Obligations 
Yhrther development of the representational formalism includes refinement of the 
temporal aspects: as identified earlier, these are currently done by explicit time- 
stamping. This is intended to cover all areas where time needs to be explicitly 
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manipulated: 
Scheduling of high level protocol activities and tasks in general. 
Monitoring of toxicity and modifiable treatment planning. 
Evaluation of treatment response criteria and subsequent treatment. 
For the purposes of this paper, however, we wish to focus on the developments 
concerning the representation f safety and other constraints, especially as regards 
the treatment of notions of obligation that arise. 
Although the current design of OaSiS separates constraints into two categories-- 
data integrity constraints and those dealing with safety knowledge---the same treat- 
ment is given to both. They use the same underlying logic and generate the same 
behaviors; only the form of messages to the user differs. 
We believe it is important o make finer distinctions according to the nature of 
the constraints to be supported in such systems. In particular, we want to deal more 
explicitly with the tension between compliance with the protocol and the need to 
allow clinicians some degree of flexibility or discretion. This tension is characteris- 
tic of any system where agents' behaviors and interactions are regulated by norms 
which specify how those agents ought to behave and how they are permitted to 
behave, whilst leaving open the possibility that actual behavior may deviate from 
what is prescribed. The formal tool associated with the characterization f such 
systems is deontic logic: for further development of OaSiS we will distinguish be- 
tween database constraints that cannot be violated and a class of "softer" deontic 
constraints whose violation can be tolerated. The application of deontic logic to 
integrity constraints in databases has been discussed in the literature (see [4, 14, 17, 
35]) though proposals vary in scope and emphasis, and the techniques remain com- 
paratively undeveloped. OaSiS provides an excellent example to drive these devel- 
opments in a practical setting. The explicit representation f notions of obligation 
in safety-critical systems has also been addressed within the RED project [5, 8]. 
Although deontic logic is ordinarily described as the logic of obligation and per- 
mission, it can be misleading to rely on this description. The reason is simply that 
words such as "obligatory," must," and "should" can have a variety of meanings. 
In [14] it is suggested that for the purpose of identifying practical applications, de- 
ontic logic is better regarded as the logic which deals with the distinction between 
what ought ideally to be the case on the one hand and what actually is the case on 
the other. 
Where a (safety) constraint is such that noncompliance is potentially life-threaten- 
ing, it is represented appropriately by a standard "hard" integrity constraint which 
allows no violation. Consider, for instance, the safety constraint [23]: 
If anaphylaxis (severe allergic reaction) occurs, Cisplatin must be stopped. 
The "must" is here adequately represented as the form of necessity already pro- 
vided by standard, "hard" integrity constraints. 
Obviously the possibility exists that such a constraint can be violated in the 
real world. One can easily imagine circumstances in which a clinician continues to 
administer a drug even though this should not, or must not, be done according to 
the protocol. However, in the context of the OaSiS application, the question is not 
whether such violations of constraints can occur in the real world, but whether we 
want to allow the possibility of violation into the database. Where safety constraints 
are represented asstandard "hard" database constraints, the OaSiS system will not 
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accept any attempt o input data which contravene them, by the standard integrity 
checking mechanisms. Such a representation effectively builds compliance with 
safety constraints into the system (cf. the discussion of "regimentation" in [14]). 
Of course, this mechanism does not guarantee compliance with safety constraints, 
because the actual behavior of clinicians is outside the control of the system--it  is 
possible that a clinician could enter one thing into the database, but actually do 
something different. However, subject o the assumption that clinicians act in good 
faith and allow themselves to be guided by the system, compliance with the safety 
constraint is guaranteed in a sense. Surely this is a realistic assumption, especially 
because attempted contraventions of safety constraints are accompanied in OaSiS 
by indications of the consequences of breach. 
Compare now the next two examples, both taken from a protocol dealing with 
the treatment of testicular cancer [23]: 
Nephrotoxic antibiotics uch as Gentamycin should be avoided during the Cis- 
platin infusion. 
The Bleomycin-Cyclophosphamide-Dactinomycin regimen will produce myelo- 
suppression and it is essential to have a nadir count between days 7 and 12 
and to warn the patient o report symptoms of infection or bleeding . . . .  
We understand that for the first example, some degree of discretion would be 
desirable in practice. There are conceivable circumstances in which a clinician might 
choose to contravene this guideline and the system should then allow such non- 
prescribed treatments to be recorded. This constraint is appropriately represented 
as a deontic integrity constraint. In the second example, we are unsure about the 
status of "essential"; this would need to be checked with a clinical oncologist and 
the constraint represented as a "hard" or "soft" integrity constraint accordingly. 
Informally, the operational behavior and the implementation f the deontic con- 
straints (of the kind sketched here) is straightforward. Attempted violations are 
detected in identical fashion to standard integrity constraints; a warning message 
is displayed to the user, but freedom to override the recommendation is available, 
subject to satisfaction of other constraints. In practice it will usually be neces- 
sary to maintain an audit trail so that treatment which deviates from the protocol 
can be monitored and subjected to later analysis, but this feature can be provided 
without difficulty. 
The point of introducing a special deontic-logical component into the represen- 
tation formalism is not just that it provides a cleaner conceptual framework for the 
constraints arising in the application. The interactions between constraints, safety 
and otherwise can be quite complex in practice, and it becomes more and more diffi- 
cult to keep track of these interactions as the set of constraints in a given application 
grows. It is obviously desirable to check for consistency among constraints, to sim- 
plify them if possible, and generally to subject them to other meaning-preserving 
transformations, independently of their application to a specific database. For in- 
stance, it seems clear that the sets of "hard" and "soft" integrity constraints should 
both be internally consistent, but it is also necessary to ensure that the two sets 
do not conflict: If there is a "hard" constraint requiring that A must be in the 
database, then there should be no "soft" constraint requiring that A should not be 
in the database; any set of constraints not satisfying this property would ordinarily 
be regarded as ill-formed at least. This property is an instance of the kind of "ought 
implies can" principle common in the formulation of many deontic logics. 
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There are good reasons to think that a simple form of deontic logic will prove 
adequate for dealing with the type of constraints encountered in OaSiS, although 
this statement is still subject to some investigation. In particular, once "soft" 
constraints and the possibility of violations are admitted, then it is natural to 
consider what other constraints come into effect in those circumstances. The proper 
formalization of "contrary-to-duty structures'--roughly, the situation where there 
is a primary obligation and a secondary obligation which comes into effect when the 
primary obligation is violated--has proved notoriously elusive and is the subject of 
much current research in the field of deontic logic. (See [27] for further discussion 
and references to some standard works in the deontic logic literature, and for some 
comparisons between contrary-to-duty and the more familiar exception structures 
studied in default and nonmonotonic reasoning.) It remains to be seen to what 
extent contrary-to-duty constraints need to be treated in the OaSiS applications. 
We have motivated the use of deontic constraints by reference to safety con- 
straints, but we do not want to give the impression that deontic constraints are 
applicable only to the representation f safety knowledge. Deontic logic can also be 
applied--less commonly and less urgently perhaps--to what we have called data in- 
tegrity in this paper. In this respect we disagree with the position expressed in [35] 
where it is proposed that database constraints can be classified (roughly) according 
to whether they correspond to statements which can be violated in the real world 
or to truths of the real world, which cannot be violated. Much of the discussion of 
this section has been concerned with indicating that norms which can be violated in 
the real world are often appropriately represented in a database by "hard" integrity 
constraints which cannot be violated. Conversely, we are in agreement with, e.g., 
Carmo and Jones [4], who point out that truths of the real world need not always 
be represented as necessary ("hard") constraints on a database because we may 
allow, for instance, that our representation is incomplete. 
It may also be desirable to pick out other categories of constraints, uch as those 
concerned with ensuring the scientific validity of the data collected uring the course 
of treatment. We mean by this that some constraints are included in protocols, 
not because contravention would constitute a life-threatening hazard or affect the 
efficacy of treatment, but because it would compromise the intended contribution 
to the objectives of the clinical trial being conducted. We can make a case then for 
three categories of constraints--for data integrity, for safety knowledge, for ensuring 
scientific wlidity of trim results; within each category, any given constraint would 
be represented either as a hard or a soft database constraint according to the nature 
of the necessity--or the "strength" of the constraint--to be represented. 
3. 3. Consideration of Clinical 7bial Recruitment 
It is theoretically possible for OaSiS to be used to screen clinical databases for 
patients who might be eligible for entry into particular trials. With completely 
automated screening, situations would arise where patients fail criteria even though 
satisfaction could be ensured if small changes to existing treatment or if delays in 
consideration of trial entry could be made. For example, a patient may be receiving 
a drug for a nonmalignant condition that is explicitly contraindicated in the trial 
protocol. There may be an alternative treatment that is not contraindicated or
it might be possible to delay consideration of trial entry until the nonmalignant 
condition has cleared up--provided the clinical judgement is that such a delay is 
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consistent with the patient's best interests. Similarly, there will often be a lack of 
up to date hematological or biochemical data needed for eligibility consideration. In 
some situations it might be possible to reason about the persistence of previously 
obtained data and estimate the likelihood that the patient could be eligible and 
that such considerations need to be pursued further. 
In some medical domains, such as in trials of new drugs in AIDS therapy, suc- 
cessful trial recruitment is very important. The Stanford group has recently been 
applying statistical and related techniques to the consideration of trial recruitment 
for this very reason in a project called T-Helper [32], a follow-on activity from 
work on the ONCOCIN system. We shall investigate the same problem but armed 
with different ools of analysis which exploit more obviously symbolic approaches 
to identify the qualifications [34, 36] necessary for eligibility. This approach can 
be viewed as the generation of incomplete arguments which need to be "repaired" 
and subsequently structured in some framework of logical uncertainty [6] so that 
eligibility can be suitably qualified. 
The development ofOaSiS began during the RED project which was funded by the United King- 
dom's Department ofTrade and Industry (DTI) and Science and Engineering Research Council 
(SERC) under the "safety critical systems" research program. Colleagues at Imperial Cancer 
Research Fund (ICRF) and collaborators in the RED project have been very helpful in providing 
comments and suggestions for improving the content of this paper and earlier drafts of the material 
presented. In particular, thanks are due to Subrata Das, John Fox, Colin Gordon, Paul Krause, 
and Jeremy Wyatt. The authors are grateful to Adrian Harris of the ICRF Clinical Oncology 
Unit at the Churchill Hospital in Oxford for comments and suggestions in relation to safety and 
clinical issues in oncology. 
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